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 Private tutoring is now a major component of the 
education sector in many developing countries, yet 
education policy too seldom acknowledges and makes 
use of it. Various criticisms have been raised against 
private tutoring, most notably that it exacerbates social 
inequalities and may even fail to improve student 
outcomes. This paper surveys the literature for evidence 
on private tutoring—the extent of the tutoring 
phenomenon, the factors that explain its growth, and 
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its cost-effectiveness in improving student academic 
performance. It also presents a framework for assessing 
the efficiency and equity effects of tutoring. It concludes 
that tutoring can raise the effectiveness of the education 
system under certain reasonable assumptions, even taking 
into account equity concerns, and it offers guidance for 
attacking corruption and other problems that diminish 
the contributions of the tutoring sector.   
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.  1.  Introduction 
Education is widely understood by developing-country policymakers to be a key determinant of 
individual productivity and economy-wide growth. Understandably, sector diagnoses and policy 
attention in the sector have focused largely on government schools and, to a far lesser extent, on the 
private-school sector. Discussions of the state of education and education policy only rarely mention 
what is emerging as a third important education sector:  the private tutoring industry.     
Yet in many countries, private tutoring has arisen as a substantial parallel educational sector that 
provides supplementary instruction to students who are enrolled in the public school system. Private 
tutoring is now a widespread educational phenomenon, and one that is on the rise. Substantial private 
tutoring industries can be found in countries as diverse economically and geographically as Romania, 
Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Cambodia, United States, and the United 
Kingdom. This survey cites evidence on the prevalence of tutoring in 22 countries, both developing 
and developed; in almost all these countries, between a quarter and 90 percent of students at certain 
levels of education are taking or have recently taken private tutoring.  In some countries, such as the 
Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”) and Turkey, spending by households on private tutoring now 
rivals public-sector education expenditures; in Korea, for example, it reaches an astonishing 2.9 
percent of GDP.        
Private tutoring has encountered mixed responses from policymakers. While it has been ignored 
in some countries, it is actively controlled and regulated in others. For example, private tutoring has 
been banned at various times in Cambodia, Mauritius, Myanmar, and Korea (Bray, 1999a). A number 
of criticisms have been raised against private tutoring, most notably that it exacerbates social 
inequalities, disrupts the (public) education system, and fails to increase either academic performance 
or human capital for students.   
To formulate good policy toward private tutoring, education policymakers need evidence. What 
factors (micro and macro) drive the demand for private tutoring? Is private tutoring used only by rich 
households? How is private tutoring different from private education or public education? What 
impacts does private tutoring have on student academic performance? Is private tutoring a cost-
effective form of education? And overall, does the evidence suggest that increased use of private 
tutoring is a welcome development, or one to be discouraged by governments?  Policymakers may 
find it preferable to take a view on these questions before private tutoring becomes even more 
entrenched.  Once it emerges as a major industry – and especially if upper-income parents see it 
providing competitive advantages to their children – it will likely be harder for governments to adjust 
policy in ways that threaten these vested interests.   
  1This paper offers a review of what we know about the determinants and effects of private 
tutoring, and then analyzes the associated equity and efficiency issues, with a focus on developing 
countries. This paper begins by establishing the importance of private tutoring as an economic 
phenomenon in much of the world, developed and developing.  It then provides a simple graphical 
framework of supply and demand for education with private tutoring, which provides theoretical 
guidance to the discussion of equity and efficiency issues later on. The next sections review (i) the 
determinants of private tutoring, from both a micro and a macro perspective, and (ii) the effects of 
tutoring on student achievement, with special attention to the statistical problems with identifying 
these effects, and to recent studies that have confronted those problems.  Finally, we use those results 
and the theoretical framework to discuss the efficiency and equity implications of private tutoring, and 
to explore their implications for policy toward tutoring, as well as to identify the areas that may 
demand more research. 
2.  Private Tutoring—A Widespread Phenomenon 
In this paper, private tutoring is defined as fee-based tutoring that provides supplementary 
instruction to children in academic subjects that they study in the mainstream education system.2 The 
literature focuses primarily on tutoring lessons for children or adolescents paid for by their 
households, so private tutoring can clearly be considered to be a form of private education. However, 
the definition is broad enough to cover special tutoring programs financed by other sources including 
the government (e.g. remedial education programs). 3 
There are good reasons why a private supplementary tutoring sector might emerge to 
complement the public and private schooling systems.  Private tutoring can offer lessons that are 
often more individualized than is possible in the public-school sector, using a more flexible delivery 
mechanism. But the private-tutoring industry is also differentiated from the private-school sector, in 
that its existence depends on the mainstream education system; it does not stand alone as an 
independent educational activity. This aspect of private tutoring helps explain why it has been referred 
to as “shadow education” (Bray, 1999a). Compared with the private-schools sector, private tutoring is 
also more informal and more flexible:  it can include not only one-to-one tutoring but also group 
classes and can be provided not only by fulltime tutors and teachers, but also by college students, 
(retired) teachers, university professors, and, in the case of Japan, even homemakers (Russell, 1997). 
Since it supplements the public sector rather than replacing it, the combination of public schooling 
and private supplementary tutoring is also more affordable for many households than private 
education would be. 
  2Japan has been a pioneer in the provision of this type of supplementary education.  Private 
tutoring has long been a huge commercial industry in Japan, with annual revenues reaching an 
estimated US$14 billion by the mid-1990s. Nine private tutoring schools were already listed on the 
Japanese stock exchange at that time, and the tutoring sector had become a “crucial component of 
Japanese education” (Russell, 1997).  Many students use school vacations, including the important 
New Year’s holiday, for intensive tutoring programs.  To stimulate “school” spirit, several private 
tutoring schools—or juku—have even had their students wear a kind of white headbands once worn 
in battle by samurai warriors (Rohlen, 1980). The proportion of college students who have spent 
additional years after high school graduation to cram for college entrance examinations, often at 
specialized private tutoring classes, averages about 30 percent.  For those who end up enrolling at the 
most highly ranked schools, the share may exceed 60 percent (Ono, 2007).4  
But recent research has made it clear that Japan is not unique in supporting a large and vibrant 
private tutoring industry. Tutoring is now widespread in many parts of the world, including the 
developing countries on which we focus in this paper. Table 1, which is largely based on Table II.1 in 
Dang (2007a), shows evidence on the extent of private tutoring in selected countries with a focus on 
developing countries. Although the studies cited there vary somewhat in methodologies and 
populations surveyed, certain patterns are clear.   
First, while the incidence appears to be highest in East Asian countries, private tutoring is now an 
important phenomenon in many countries of different size, level of economic development, political 
institutions, or geographical locations. In some cases, spending on private tutoring approaches the 
level of spending on the formal public system. In Korea, households spent 2.9 percent of GDP on 
private tutoring in 1998, almost equaling the 3.4 percent of GDP spent on education by the public 
sector (Kim and Lee, 2004). A similar situation happens in Turkey, where the corresponding figures 
are 1.44 percent of GDP for private tutoring and 2 percent for public education expenditures (Tansel 
and Bircan, 2006). 
Second, private tutoring is an important phenomenon not only for upper-secondary students 
preparing for university exams, but also for students at the primary and lower secondary levels, and 
sometimes (as in Japan) even among upper-secondary graduates.     
Third, the private tutoring industry appears to be growing in many countries, both in absolute 
terms and relative to the formal education sector.  Table 1 includes evidence of growth in terms of the 
percentage of students taking tutoring (in Kenya and Mauritius) and the number of private tutoring 
firms catering to them (in Turkey and Canada).5 Evidence on tutoring expenditures, where it is 
available, also supports the notion that the sector is growing, as in Korea, where household spending 
as a share of GDP on private tutoring rose continuously from 0.7 percent of GDP in 1977 to 1.2 in 
1990 and 2.9 in 1998.  Finally, anecdotal reports also suggest an expansion in tutoring elsewhere; for 
  3example, in both low-income countries such as Vietnam (Dang, 2007a) and high-income countries 
such as the US (Fuchs, 2002; Borja, 2005), some households have reportedly begun sending their 
children to private tutoring to give them an edge as early as preschool.  
3.  Education Supply and Demand with Private Tutoring:  A Framework 
This section presents a simple graphical framework, based on the standard microeconomic theory 
of supply and demand, for interpreting the private tutoring phenomenon. Figure 1 shows, for a typical 
household, the supply of and demand for education in the case where private tutoring is available. 
The supply of education is represented by the supply curves S0 for private education, S1 for public 
education, and S2 for public education with private tutoring. S1 is different from S2 in that while the 
two curves share a common solid upward-sloping part ending at point A, the former includes the 
solid vertical line rising from point A, while the latter includes a dashed diagonal line starting from 
point A. (It is also possible to think about the dashed line as the supply curve for private tutoring 
alone).   
The rationale for the vertical part of S1, starting from point A, is that regardless of consumer 
demand, after a certain point, public schools may reach their capacity limit, preventing them from 
offering as much education—in terms of both quantity and quality—as parents or students want 
(perfectly inelastic supply).6 By contrast, the dashed portion of the supply curve S2 for public 
education with private tutoring is less steep than the vertical part of S1, representing the ability of 
private tutoring to meet demand for education where the public education system cannot. At the same 
time, that portion of S2 is also steeper than the lower sloping part of S1, reflecting the assumption that, 
even in cases where the public school requires fees, private tutoring will usually cost the household 
more than public schooling does.7  
Note that a household has to incur certain costs to send a child to school (for example, school-
related fees or opportunity costs for the child going to school instead of working), even if school is 
provided free of tuition. The household demand for education is represented by either the demand 
curve D1 (low demand) or D2 (high demand). Thus, in our figure, compared to a representative 
household with the demand curve D1, the demand curve D2 represents another household that is 
assumed to have either higher income, stronger education preferences, higher expectations about 
future returns, or some combination of these variables. 8 
The amount of education the household consumes is represented by the amount on the 
horizontal axis corresponding to the point where the supply and demand curves meet. Thus, if the 
representative household’s demand for education is represented by the demand curve D2, the amount 
of public education the household consumes is Q2. However, in the presence of private tutoring, the 
  4same household can consume a larger amount of education at Q*2 since the supply curve of education 
in this case is not constrained by the vertical part rising at point A.   
This setup, which we refer to as the “standard framework”, underlies the discussion below on the 
determinants and welfare consequences of tutoring.  The framework incorporates certain assumptions 
that will not always be valid, and so we return to those below.  One assumption is that the market for 
private tutoring is competitive, and indeed that households are allowed to choose whether to purchase 
tutoring services.  A second is that public schooling reaches a strict capacity constraint after a certain 
point, which is likely a better description of the short run than of the long run.  In section 6, we will 
explore how relaxing these assumptions would change our analytical and policy conclusions.   
4.  Drivers of Private Tutoring 
To understand the equity and productivity effects of the large and growing private-tutoring 
sector, and to design policy, it is essential to understand what factors, both micro and macro, lead to 
demand for tutoring.  Factors at the micro level may include the different characteristics of 
individuals, households, schools, and communities. Macro-level factors may include the share of 
public education expenditure in a nation’s GDP, the characteristics of its education system and labor 
market, and its cultural values. Together, these factors determine the level and slope of the tutoring 
demand curve for the society as a whole – specifically, the size of the gap between D1 and D2, in our 
simplified two-class model depicted in Figure 1.  In this section, we present the evidence from the 
literature on these two sets of explanatory factors. 
4.1.  Micro factors 
From standard economic theory, we would expect certain factors to increase household’s demand 
for education (or shift households’ demand curve for education outward in Figure 1):  household 
income, their tastes for education, and their expectations about the returns to education for their 
children.  These same factors therefore explain heterogeneity of demand across household types, as in 
the simplified two-type model in Figure 1.  Compared to households on the demand curve D1, which 
consume no private tutoring at the given supply curve for private tutoring S2, households on the 
demand curve D2 consume a positive amount (Q*2 - Q2) of private tutoring.      
Empirical evidence supports our intuition about what factors tend to increase demand.  Table 2 
lists the most important micro determinants of tutoring for Egypt (Assaad and El-Badawy, 2004), 
Japan (Baker, 1992), Korea (Kim and Lee, 2004), Turkey (Tansel and Bircan, 2006), and Vietnam 
(Dang, 2007b).  We highlight these studies because they all use nationally representative data, but the 
choice of countries has other benefits as well:  the private tutoring sector is relatively prominent in all 
of them, and together they capture some of the geographical variation in the phenomenon.9 
  5In these studies, the variables that most influence attendance at private tutoring include 
household income (household wealth for Egypt, household expenditure in the case of Turkey and 
Vietnam), parental education, and whether the household lives in an urban area.  The latter two 
variables arguably correspond to household tastes for education. All these variables predict higher 
student attendance at private tutoring, meaning that students from richer, more educated households 
living in urban areas will be more likely to attend and spend more on tutoring classes. These results 
are not unexpected, but they are surprisingly consistent across the countries and fairly robust to the 
different models being used.10  
Other factors that may matter across countries are the student’s grade level and household size.  
In Egypt, students in diploma-granting years spend more on private tutoring (Assaad and El-Badawy, 
2004); in Vietnam, the closer students are to the last grade in their current school level, the more they 
spend on private tutoring (Dang, 2007b). And in Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam, the number of children 
in households is found to be negatively correlated with private tutoring expenditures (Kim and Lee, 
2004; Tansel and Bircan, 2006; Dang, 2007b). Presumably, the grade-level pattern reflects the use of 
private tutoring to prepare for the school-leaving examinations, while the household-size effect hints 
at the much-studied quantity-quality tradeoff between number of children and average child 
educational achievement.11 However, these variables are not used in all the studies, and the household 
size variable is likely to be endogenous (see the next section for more discussion) which may bias 
estimated results. Thus it is not possible to investigate whether these two patterns hold for all these 
five countries, or to draw firm conclusions from them.  
Beyond this core group of factors, other variables that affect spending on private tutoring vary 
from country to country.  This diversity of findings may simply reflect differences in the models or in 
the variables available in the datasets of the different countries; alternatively, it could reflect country-
level differences in tutoring patterns, perhaps as a result of differing institutions, cultures, or relative 
prices.   
Another micro question naturally arises: do students take private tutoring for remedial or 
enrichment purposes? In other words, are most tutored students those who are performing at levels 
below or above their (conditionally) expected levels? Analyzing data from the Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in 1995 for 41 countries, Baker et al. (2001) show that in 
three-fourths of these countries, private tutoring is used significantly more often by low math 
achievers than by high achievers, controlling for family income, student, and community 
characteristics.  That study calculates that the probability of attending private tutoring increases by 3.5 
percent for each point decrease in TIMSS mathematics scores in countries such as Denmark, 
Germany and the United States.  
  6The core explanatory factors common to all studies—income, parental education, urban 
location—echo those usually found to be important determinants of schooling attainment and 
performance in developing countries.  The examination of 35 developing countries by Filmer and 
Pritchett (1999), for example, finds that “household wealth is strongly related to educational 
attainment of children nearly everywhere”.  The multicountry analysis in Hanushek and Luque (2003) 
finds that parental education and family asset ownership are as important in explaining children’s test 
scores in developing countries, on average, as they are in developed countries.  And in country-level 
studies, there are many examples of similar findings.  To take just a few, Tansel (1997) finds that in 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, parental education, household consumption, and urban location all predict 
greater educational attainment, and Tansel (1998) finds the same results for Turkey.   
4.2.  Macro factors 
The literature on tutoring has cited several factors as likely drivers of the demand for private 
tutoring on a macro (economy-wide) level. First, the transition to a market economy has substantially 
increased the amounts of private tutoring (supplied and demanded) in countries where it did not exist 
earlier – China, Vietnam, some African countries, and many Eastern European countries in the 
former Soviet bloc (Bray, 1999a). Second, it has been argued that tight linkages between education 
and work are argued to result in intense competition for more education, and thus private tutoring 
(Stevenson and Baker, 1992). An extreme form of these linkages is what is called the “diploma 
disease” (Dore, 1976)—whereby modern bureaucratic organizations may use a person’s degree as an 
initial screening tool for employment, regardless of whether the person receives the intrinsic 
education skills symbolized by the degree.  This phenomenon has arguably fueled the demand for 
private tutoring in a number of countries.12 Third, a deficient public education system may make 
parents resort to using private tutoring to compensate for poor quality (Kim and Lee, 2004). Low pay 
levels and weak monitoring of teachers in the public system can also cause teachers to force tutoring 
on students (Buchmann, 1999; Silova and Bray, 2006a), as formalized in a theoretical model by Biswal 
(1999).13 Fourth, it has been argued that cultural values may explain why private tutoring is more 
prevalent in some countries, notably in East Asia (Bray, 1999a).  
However, little formal empirical research has been done to test these hypotheses. The only cross-
country study that has looked at the macro factors determining the use of private tutoring is Baker et 
al. (2001). Using data for 41 countries participating in the 3rd TIMSS international student assessment, 
that paper finds that higher public education expenditures (as a share of GNP) and gross enrollment 
rates predict lower use of private tutoring, but that a high-stakes testing system has no significant 
impact on private tutoring. The former result suggests that private tutoring is more popular in 
countries with weak and deficient public education systems. The analysis does not control for per-
  7capita income levels, however, and because income levels are highly correlated with both public 
education expenditures and gross enrolment rates, this omission may bias their estimation results.14  
5.  Impacts of Private Tutoring on Student Learning   
To understand the policy implications of the growth of the private tutoring industry, we need to 
understand not only its determinants – who is investing in tutoring, and why? – but also its 
consequences for those who are being tutored.  Does all of this expenditure on private tutoring yield 
substantial returns for the individual learner?  For society as a whole?   
In standard models, the presumption would be that private tutoring must yield substantial returns 
in terms of learning.  From descriptions of tutoring, it is clear that for most students, tutoring is 
investment rather than consumption.  Therefore, if households consist of well-informed, sovereign 
consumers focused on learning and ultimately on increased productivity in the workforce, we would 
expect significantly positive returns for the individual.  But this is not the only possibility.  First, 
consumers could be poorly informed about returns.  Even econometricians find it challenging to tease 
out the returns to tutoring (as discussed below), and it may be very hard for households to know for 
sure whether their investment will pay off, particularly since any wage returns may be realized only 
after many years.  Second, the consumers may not be sovereign:  parents who pay for the tutoring 
may have objectives other than improving their children’s learning and productivity, such as finding 
child care.  And finally, most children could see tutoring as consumption rather than investment. 
Here, we review the evidence on learning gains attributable to tutoring.  First, however, we 
discuss an important econometric issue:  the potential endogeneity of tutoring.  Quite a few studies of 
tutoring have not addressed this issue seriously, which makes their results less illuminating.  We 
present a variety of studies, but focus primarily on the results from the handful of studies that have 
dealt with endogeneity effectively. 
5.1.  Endogeneity of private tutoring  
If we are interested in estimating the effects of private tutoring on performance, a naïve first 
approach would be to use micro-level data to estimate the following equation:     
 
A= α + βT + γX + ε 
 
where A is a student’s academic performance, T is his or her attendance at or spending on private 
tutoring classes, X is a vector of other student, household, school and community characteristics (e.g., 
the student’s age, gender, household socio-economic status, household residence place, school 
  8quality), ε is the error term, and α, β, and γ are the parameters to be estimated.  In this setup, the 
estimated parameter β would therefore be the estimated return to private tutoring. 
But in practice, this approach, at least as it is usually implemented, is likely to yield unreliable 
estimates of the coefficient on private tutoring, since students who take private tutoring may differ in 
various unobserved but important dimensions from those who do not. One such dimension is the 
level of parental concern for their children’s education.  This variable is hard to measure and is 
therefore usually excluded from these analyses; yet we know that parents who are strongly oriented 
toward their children’s education may directly help their children succeed in school (for example, by 
helping them with their homework) while at the same time spending money to send the children to 
private tutoring classes. Another example is a student’s motivation for studies, which can rarely be 
measured in practice. Highly motivated students may be more willing to take private tutoring than 
their less motivated peers, but are likely also to perform better than predicted in school for reasons 
unrelated to tutoring.  
Thus private tutoring is endogenous, in that these unobserved factors affect both investment in 
private tutoring, on the one hand, and the student’s performance at school, on the other.15 If not 
properly controlled for in regression analysis, all these unobserved characteristics will end up in the 
error term ε, and due to their correlation with the private tutoring variable, they will make estimation 
results inconsistent and unreliable. (In other words, estimation results suffer from selection bias if 
analyses do not properly address the fact that students attending private tutoring are different from 
those who do not). This identification problem is analogous to others in the education literature, such 
as the difficulty of estimating whether religious and other private schools yield better student 
outcomes than public schools do.16  
Three econometric techniques have been used in the literature to deal with the endogeneity of 
private tutoring. The first and perhaps cleanest approach, where possible, is to run experiments that 
randomly assign students into comparable treatment and control groups, with only the members of 
the treatment group receiving private tutoring.  With such a set-up, researchers can use a straight 
difference-in-difference comparison of the gains in educational outcomes for the two groups to 
estimate the returns to private tutoring.17 Even with this set-up, interpreting the results is challenging, 
because students cannot be assigned to purchase private tutoring; instead, they are only assigned to 
receive free tutoring, which may be an important difference.18   
A second approach, implemented ex post using observational data, relies on quasi-experimental 
identification of the effects of tutoring by using a difference-in-difference analysis as a program is 
rolled out across the country. Note that this approach too has had to rely on measuring the effects of 
tutoring provided by the program, rather than by privately purchased tutoring services. 
  9The third approach is to rely on instrumental variables (IV) that correlate with private tutoring 
attendance (and/or expenditure), but do not correlate with the unobserved characteristics described 
above (such as parental concern or student motivation).  This approach has the advantage of 
measuring the effects of private tutoring that emerges as a result of household decisions, rather than 
government programs; the disadvantage is that such IV estimates are likely to be more sensitive to 
econometric assumptions than the experimental and quasi-experimental estimates.   
5.2.  Impacts of private tutoring: Recent evidence 
Table 3 categorizes recent studies on the impacts of private tutoring into those that control for 
the endogeneity of private tutoring, as described above, and those that do not. In addition to the 
standard type of tutoring paid for by the household, the table includes studies on remedial education 
programs—special tutoring programs for underperforming students—financed by sources other than 
households. 
Among the studies that do not control for endogeneity, there is mixed evidence on the impacts of 
private tutoring on student academic performance. These studies indicate that private tutoring has 
positive impacts in Japan (Stevenson and Baker, 2001), Kenya (Buchmann, 2002), and Vietnam (Ha 
and Harpham, 2005), but it has negative impacts in Korea (Lee et al, 2004) and Singapore (Cheo and 
Quah, 2005). The results from these studies should be received with caution, however, because of the 
endogeneity resulting from self-selection into tutoring (as some of the studies themselves 
acknowledge). In addition, as noted in Table 3, two of these studies do not control for school 
characteristics, and one study includes another endogenous variable (student academic standing) that 
may further bias the estimation results.   
By contrast, the studies that control in some credible way for the endogeneity of private tutoring 
generally find that private tutoring boosts student academic performance. Tutoring lessons are found 
to increase test scores in India (Banerjee et al., 2007), mean matriculation rates in Israel (Lavy and 
Schlosser, 2005), the quality of colleges in which students can enroll in Japan (Ono, 2007), both SAT 
and ACT test scores (except for ACT reading scores) and academic performance in the US (Briggs, 
2001; Jacob and Lefgren, 2004),19 and student academic performance in Vietnam (Dang, 2007b).  The 
sole exception is in Indonesia (Suryadarma et al., 2006), where tutoring was not associated with higher 
performance by 4th-graders.20 While it would be useful to see if the estimated negative correlations 
between private tutoring and achievement in Korea and Singapore change when endogeneity is 
properly addressed, no studies that we know of have addressed this issue.   
We discuss the three studies for India, Israel, and Vietnam in more detail, because these studies 
include cost data, making it is possible to consider both the impacts of tutoring lessons on academic 
performance and its cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, these studies reflect the variation in the usage 
  10and financing of tutoring lessons: they include both low-income (India and Vietnam) and high-income 
(Israel) countries; they include estimation of tutoring effects on students of all academic abilities 
(Vietnam) and underperforming students (India and Israel); and finally, they include tutoring that is 
privately financed (Vietnam), publicly financed (Israel), and NGO-financed (India).  
NGO-financed remedial tutoring in India 
Pratham—a large Indian NGO—recently financed the implementation of a two-year tutoring 
program in schools in two major cities in India that cater to poor children. This remedial education 
program was targeted at the weakest children, those in grades 3 or 4 that had not mastered the basic 
skills. These students were taken out of their classroom and given two hours of additional instruction 
each day by young women from the community—private tutors, in effect, rather than formal teachers.   
Banerjee et al. (2007) find that this tutoring program improved student test scores by large and 
statistically significant amounts. Children randomly assigned to the treatment group improved their 
test scores by 0.6 standard deviations in the second year, while control children remaining in the 
regular classroom did not benefit. Overall, the test scores of children whose schools benefit from this 
program improved by 0.14 standard deviations in the first year and by 0.28 standard deviations in the 
second year. However, these gains fell substantially one year after the program ended, suggesting that 
more research is needed on the long-term impacts of such programs.  
The authors attribute the relative success of the program to regular teachers’ lack of motivation to 
help lagging students and to the common background shared by the students and the young women 
tutors. The authors also show that this tutoring program is cost-effective. At around $10-15 per 
month, the tutors’ salary is equivalent to only 6 to 10 percent of the salary of a starting teacher.  As a 
result, Banerjee et al. (2007) calculate that scaling up the tutoring program would be much more cost-
effective than hiring new teachers would be, at least in terms of achieving a given improvement in test 
scores. The program, which has already reached tens of thousand of children across India, is 
estimated to cost around $2.25 per student per year.21  
Government-financed remedial tutoring in Israel 
A special tutoring (remedial education) program for underperforming high school students has 
been implemented in Israel since 1999, expanding until it reached around one-third of all high schools 
across the country around 2002 (Lavy and Schlosser, 2005).  The objective of the program is to 
increase the number of students that earn matriculation certificates by providing them with increased 
instructional time. In each school, the program identifies groups of up to five students in the tenth, 
eleventh, or twelfth grades who are performing poorly and judged most likely to fail their 
matriculation exams. The classroom teachers then give these students after-school tutoring lessons in 
these subjects.  
  11To examine the effects of the program, Lavy and Schlosser (2005) use a quasi-experimental 
difference-in-difference methodology (supplemented by instrumental variables as an alternative 
identification strategy).  Their approach relies on the fact that the program was rolled out over time, 
allowing them to compare learning gains in schools that received it early on with those in schools that 
received it later. Lavy and Schlosser find that this tutoring program had a positive impact on both the 
students and the schools benefiting from the program. The program increased the probability of 
earning a matriculation certificate for tutored students by 12 percentage points, implying an average 
improvement of 22 percent from the base rate. The targeted schools saw approximately an increase of 
3.3 percentage points in the mean matriculation rates, equivalent to an improvement of 6 percent. The 
program did not appear to affect non-tutored students. 
On the other side of the ledger, Lavy and Schlosser note that the average cost of the program is 
rather high, at $1,100 per tutored student, or around 40 percent of the annual expenditure per high 
school student in Israel. Nevertheless, Lavy and Schlosser (2005) estimate the program’s internal rate 
of return at a rather high 20 percent. 22  While this makes the remedial education program less cost-
effective for increasing matriculation than two other incentive-based programs in Israel examined by 
the authors, they note this rate of return still makes the remedial tutoring program cost-effective. 
Private household-financed tutoring in Vietnam 
Private tutoring is very popular in Vietnam, with around 34 percent of the households with 
children in school sending their children to private lessons. A large majority of these households (90 
percent) allocate between 1 percent and 5 percent of the total household expenditure to private 
tutoring. The proportions of students taking private tutoring are 31%, 56%, and 77%, respectively, in 
primary school, lower secondary school, and upper secondary school (Dang, 2007b).  
Dang (2007b) estimates the learning effects of tutoring and addresses the endogeneity of tutoring 
with an instrumental variables strategy, which used tutoring prices as the instrument. Using data from 
the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys for 1992-93 and 1997-98, Dang shows that private tutoring 
improves student academic performance. After controlling for other individual, household, school 
and community characteristics, Dang finds that increasing yearly spending on private tutoring from 0 
to only 20,000 VND
23—about US$1.50 in 1998, or about 0.4 percent of mean consumption for 
households with children in school—has strongly positive effects on performance. It decreases a 
primary-school student’s probability of having a poor and average academic ranking, respectively, by 
around 0.01 and 0.04, while increasing the probability of having a good or excellent academic ranking 
by 0.05. At the same increase in expenditure, the corresponding figures for a lower secondary student 
are higher at around 0.01, 0.07, and 0.08 respectively.   
  12Since students with an academic ranking of “poor” usually have to repeat grades in Vietnam, 
these estimates can be used to make a rough calculation of the cost-effectiveness of tutoring in 
promoting grade progression among lower secondary school students. A year of lower secondary 
schooling has a total cost (direct costs to the household and the government, plus assumed 
opportunity cost of forgone wages) of around 3 million VND per year. Ceteris paribus, under the 
assumption that the household’s aim is for the child to complete a given level of education, a 
reduction of 1 percentage point in the probability of earning a poor academic ranking reduces 
expected costs from grade repetition by around 30,000 VND. But since the cost of the tutoring is 
20,000 VND, this means that the benefits from lower repetition rates alone exceed the costs of the 
tutoring.24  In fact, the benefits may be much higher than these monetary gains because these 
calculations do not account for any economic benefits of improving in the better academic ranking 
categories, or for any avoided psychological costs associated with having to repeat a grade. 
Interpreting the evidence 
Thus in the recent studies that have both dealt with endogeneity of tutoring and estimated cost 
effectiveness, private tutoring is found to have strongly positive returns. Some caution is needed in 
interpreting the evidence, of course. First, this line of analysis is made fundamentally difficult by the 
nature of the typical private-tutoring transactions:  typically it is the household (rather than an NGO 
or government) that decides whether to purchase private tutoring, and it is hard to imagine that 
decision could be randomized across households as an aid to clean measurement of the returns to 
tutoring. At best, a government could randomize access to potential tutors—for example, by flooding 
certain randomly chosen communities with unemployed graduates—and then see whether households 
chose to consume more tutoring and how this consumption affected student performance.  It is for 
this reason that the evidence on returns must rely on government- and NGO-financed tutoring 
programs, or on identifying exogenous variation in the use of tutoring.  
Second, estimation results from these studies should be considered in context, and should neither 
be generalized to all students nor narrowed to specific sub-groups of tutored students. Most of the 
studies cited in Table 3 estimated only the average return for all students enrolled in tutoring; this 
approach implicitly assumes that all students share the same returns to private tutoring, regardless of 
their innate ability or socio-economic background. [Exceptions include the studies by Banerjee et al., 
2007; Lavy and Schlosser, 2005; and Jacob and Lefgren, 2004.]  If this homogeneity assumption is 
violated, estimated benefits of tutoring will not apply to sub-groups, and they may be biased as well.25 
It is not easy to take account of this heterogeneity in returns to private tutoring, however. Doing so 
requires detailed data on the student variables that may affect returns, as well as more sophisticated 
estimation techniques. Thus most of the cited studies can provide only general guidance to policy 
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and Schlosser, 2005), and the US (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004) show that remedial private tutoring 
improves student performance, this result may hold only for the grade groups evaluated.  Clearly, 
more detailed policies would demand more in-depth analysis of specific groups in particular contexts.  
Subject to these caveats, however, it appears that tutoring can generally have substantially positive 
returns as a supplement to formal public-school education. In addition, the programs on which we 
have direct evidence may provide good starting points for policy makers seeking to design and 
implement supplementary education programs.  
6.  What Stance Should Policymakers Take toward Tutoring?  Efficiency 
and Equity Considerations 
Given the evidence reviewed above, what conclusions can we reach about the efficiency and 
equity of private tutoring?  We discuss our perspectives on these issues in this section using the 
economic framework from section 2. At first, we do this analysis while maintaining our assumptions 
that the market is perfect and the supply curve for public schooling is perfectly inelastic after a certain 
point. Later, we discuss how these conclusions change when those assumptions are relaxed.  
6.1.  Efficiency considerations in the standard case  
The micro evidence on private tutoring suggests, once endogeneity caused by selection is properly 
accounted for, that private tutoring generally improves student academic performance for the average 
tutored student.  More limited evidence suggests that these improvements can be cost-effective. A 
question for policymakers is whether from a broader social perspective, the availability of private 
tutoring increases overall welfare. Are the societal gains from private tutoring likely to be greater than 
its costs?    
Unfortunately, there have apparently been no studies on the efficiency of private tutoring at the 
macro level. However, combining the micro evidence with the analytical framework from Section 2 
helps answer this question. An analysis of Figure 1 suggests that availability of private tutoring 
increases efficiency and welfare (under certain assumptions that we revisit below). For a household 
whose demand for education is represented by the demand curve D2, if private tutoring is available, 
the household consumes education in the amount Q*2. This is more than both the amount of public 
education (Q2) that the household consumes in the absence of private tutoring and the amount of 
private education (Q0) that the household can afford. 26 Households gain additional consumer surplus 
of an amount represented by the triangle BCE, while tutors—who are often public-school teachers 
working an outside tutoring job—gain producer surplus in the amount represented by the triangle 
ABE.  
  14There is one other effect not shown directly on the graph.  High-demand households that would 
formerly have chosen private schools may now choose to enroll their children in a combination of 
public schools and private tutoring. As demand for public schools increases, the costs to the 
government might be expected to rise, and producer surplus to private schools will fall.  But because 
we are assuming that the public schools are on the vertical portion of their supply curve—that is, that 
they have reached capacity—the quantity of education provided by the government does not actually 
increase, and neither will government outlays. And standard micro analysis makes it clear that the total 
gains to households and tutors through the public school/private tutoring combination should exceed 
the losses in the private schools sector. Thus compared to the situation in which households face only 
a choice between public education and private education alone, our graphical framework suggests that 
offering the opportunity to supplement a public education with private tutoring increases welfare for 
households and the society as a whole – at least in the standard model. We return below to some 
caveats.    
6.2.  Equity considerations in the standard case 
Suppose policy-makers are convinced that overall the existence of a robust private tutoring sector 
improves welfare, but worry that it may exacerbate inequality. Judging from Tables 2 and 3, there is 
indeed reason for concern. More privileged households—those with higher income and more 
education, living in urban areas—invest more in tutoring for their children than other households do, 
and private tutoring appears often to increase learning achievements for these children, at least on 
average. If we make the standard assumption that learning achievement translates into higher lifetime 
earnings, then we would expect that the availability of household-financed tutoring will increase social 
inequalities.  
Nevertheless, there are several reasons that we should not be too quick to equate tutoring with 
increasing inequality, nor to assume that an equity-focused government should try to limit tutoring. 
First, when we specify the appropriate counterfactual—what would happen in the absence of a private 
tutoring sector?—tutoring may not increase educational inequality by as much as suggested above. 
Even productive tutoring may confer only a minor additional advantage on children from wealthier 
and more educated households. Those households already give their children educational advantages 
in many other ways—by providing the children with more books, more learning equipment, and even 
fulltime private schooling, for example, or by taking the time to teach their children themselves. A ban 
on private tutoring, even if it were enforceable, would likely just redirect the educational expenditures 
of better-off households into these other investments. Furthermore, compared with the situation in 
which only the public and private school sectors exist, access to supplementary private tutoring may 
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children enrolled in private schools.  
Second, note that tutoring may actually emerge as an unintended result of other government 
education policies—including some policies aimed at promoting equity. For example, imagine that the 
government substantially increases its per-student financing for public education in poor (low-
demand) neighborhoods. In Figure 1, this would shift the supply curve S2 in Figure 1 downward.  If 
the shift is substantial enough, it will have the effect of inducing those low-demand households to 
consume more education, including more private tutoring. This possibility provides another reason 
not to assume that the existence of private tutoring signals equity problems. 
Thus to control educational inequality, governments may find it more effective to attack its roots 
directly, rather than discouraging the tutoring that is in part a symptom of inequality. Korea took this 
tack in 1974, when it sought to control the growth of private tutoring by adopting a secondary-school 
equalization program (Kim, 2005). That program switched to allocating secondary-school entrance by 
lottery rather than examination; it thereby reduced the quality advantages of higher-ranking schools 
and also in theory reduced the incentive for exam-preparation tutoring. While demand for tutoring 
has in fact remained high, Korea is not generally thought to have severe intergenerational 
transmission of inequality via education. 
Third, as shown in Section 5, governments can actually use tutoring as a tool to improve equity. 
The household-financed tutoring in the market equilibrium in Figure 1 benefits children from high-
demand households, which will tend to be wealthier, but governments and others can target special 
tutoring programs at underperforming students.  Examples include the cases of Israel (Lavy and 
Schlosser, 2005) and the US (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004) described above. In effect, the government 
would be segmenting the market depicted in Figure 1 by driving the supply curve S2 downward, but 
only for low-demand households. In this case, the equity implications are clearly positive, assuming 
that the subsidy is financed progressively.  
6.3.  What if the availability of tutoring blocks public-school improvements? 
The first assumption that needs to be relaxed is that public education is capacity-constrained—
meaning that at the upper end of its range, the supply of education is perfectly inelastic. In practice, 
this assumption is likely to hold, even approximately, only in the short term. Over the long run, 
governments can and do take steps to increase the quantity of effective education delivered, for 
example by expanding school capacity to allow longer schooling hours, or by improving teacher 
attendance and time on task. Such improvements extend the upward-sloping portion of the public 
supply curve in Figure 1 and shift the vertical section outward.      
  16Distinguishing between the short and long runs therefore matters.  Under our earlier assumptions 
of the short-run standardized framework model depicted in Figure 1, private tutoring occupied a 
neutral territory away from the usual public-versus-private education debates.  Public and private 
schools are typically depicted as substitutes—which they generally are, at least at the level of the 
individual student.27 But in the situation depicted in Figure 1, privately provided education in the 
form of tutoring is a complement to public schooling.  Under these conditions, as discussed above, 
private tutoring enables parents to invest in an optimal amount of education for their children, 
increasing both consumer and producer surplus.  
Thus in the short run, private tutoring and public education appear to be complements. But in the 
long run, private tutoring may substitute for public education. Here, the long run is defined as the time 
it takes to make substantial improvements in the quality of public schooling – which, based on real-
life experience, can be quite some time.  The availability of tutoring could diminish parents’ interest in 
lobbying for these long-term improvements in the quality of public education. If urban elites find that 
tutoring gives their children an advantage in competitive examinations or the labor market, and if they 
fear that any future public-school improvements would go primarily to schools serving disadvantaged 
areas, then they may prefer to remain at the status quo. In Japan, it has been argued that educational 
reforms to expand public school activities have been blocked by the dependence on private tutoring 
to perform these tasks (LeTendre, 1994). In other words, the tutoring market may serve as an outlet 
releasing political pressure for reform and quality improvement.   
In fact, in the long run, private tutoring may provide less of a spur to public quality than 
competition from private schools does.  It has been argued that loss (or potential loss) of students to 
private schools puts pressure on public schools to improve quality (Rouse 1998, Hoxby 1994, Bishop 
and Wossman 2004), but private tutoring will likely have no such effect – because the public schools 
do not actually lose students as a result. 
Note that the question here is not whether private tutoring enables or undermines the public 
sector’s role as a provider of education. In practice, public schooling is and will continue to be a part 
of virtually every national primary- and secondary-education system, whatever the views of education 
experts on both sides of the public-private debate. The take-away point is simply that where tutoring 
is widespread, it will likely have important effects on the quality and efficiency of the public schools, 
and that policy will need to take account of those effects, both short- and long-term.   
6.4.  What if teacher corruption makes the tutoring market uncompetitive?  
A second assumption underlying the standardized model is that the market for tutoring is 
competitive. But this may not be the case. Public-school teachers may have substantial market power 
as suppliers of private tutoring, especially in situations sometimes found in developing countries. In 
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tutoring. More worryingly, teachers who are corrupt and poorly monitored (see Glewwe and Kremer, 
2006) sometimes force their public-school students to take their private tutoring lessons, by 
intentionally omitting part of the curriculum during regular classroom hours or making it an overt 
requirement (Buchmann, 1999; Foondun, 2002; Silova and Bray, 2006a).28   
In this case, the teacher’s monopoly power will reduce the consumer surplus of the high-demand 
consumers. In a sense, the dysfunctional monitoring system coupled with teachers’ corruption would 
blur the borderline between public education and private tutoring. Graphically, this will both increase 
the slope of the (ostensibly public) supply curve S2 and shift it to the left in Figure 1, causing the 
household to pay a higher price than before for the same amount of education. The more market 
power the teachers have, the more leftward they may try to shift the supply curve. As we would 
expect given the teacher’s monopoly power, consumer surplus falls by more than the gain in producer 
surplus to the teacher. In such cases, we are not likely to see the substantial returns to tutoring cited in 
the empirical studies above.  
Not only is this outcome worse than the no-corruption, competitive private tutoring equilibrium, 
but for households, it may also be worse than the situation in the case without private tutoring. In the 
worst case, tutoring fees are then simply a net transfer from households to teachers: the amount of 
education provided remains the same, but the teacher delivers part of it for a fee outside of school 
hours. In the rural areas where teacher governance is poor and this type of corruption is most likely to 
flourish, the transfer will usually be regressive, since teachers tend to have considerably higher 
incomes than the average rural resident.29 Moreover, evidence on service delivery suggests that it is 
the poorest households—the low-demand households in our graphs—that suffer the most from 
failures in service delivery (World Bank 2003) and that have to pay the largest bribes, relative to 
consumption level (Hunt and Laszlo 2005).  As a result, the transfer will likely reduce equity and 
overall welfare.   
their 
This analysis of potential teacher corruption has two implications for policy:  First, it suggests that 
in the absence of mechanisms to control teacher corruption, allowing private tutoring may in fact be 
counterproductive in some cases. More realistically, given the difficulties and undesirability of banning 
tutoring outright, it provides a rationale for measures to prevent public-school teachers from tutoring 
their own students privately. Ukraine’s education ministry imposed such a ban in 2004, for example, 
in response to complaints from parents that teachers were providing “compulsory private tutoring” 
(Hrynevych et al., 2006).               
  186.5.  What if the tutoring is not aimed only at increasing human capital? 
Another question is how our diagnosis changes if the tutoring is not necessarily productive from a 
societal perspective. Throughout this analysis, we have assumed implicitly that an increase in 
education units consumed by the student not only increases his or her future productivity (and hence 
wages), but also increases societal productivity by an equivalent amount. In theory, this need not be 
the case. If tests measure student characteristics that have signaling value but no productive value, 
then there may be no societal benefit to the increase in education made possible by tutoring—even 
though there are private benefits to the tutored students.  This would be the extreme version of the 
signaling model introduced by Spence (1973). In such a signaling equilibrium, policymakers would be 
right to worry about the social costs of the tutoring industry, because that industry would in essence 
be an arms merchant in a negative-sum educational arms race.   
While this extreme theoretical case certainly does not apply anywhere, criticism of some aspects 
of otherwise high-performing education systems in Korea and Japan—both of which have very large 
private tutoring sectors—has cited the perceived uselessness of some of the material that tutoring 
students learn in preparation for university entrance examinations. Concerns about the “inordinate 
financial burden to parents” of tutoring in Korea (Kim 2001) have justified reform, for example, and 
they are consistent with an argument that the long-term financial returns do not justify these costs. As 
noted earlier, empirical evidence suggests a bunching of private-tutoring investment immediately 
before school-leaving or university entrance exams, which is consistent with a signaling story. To take 
another example, standardized tests for admission to law schools in the United States, which have 
given rise to a large test-preparation industry, have been criticized for being widely used despite their 
inability to predict the applicants’ ultimate performance as lawyers (Haddon and Post, 2006).30 The 
mere fact that the LSAT is an aptitude (not achievement) test, but that many test-takers prepare for it 
by learning test-taking skills from tutoring firms, suggest that the test results contain an element of 
signaling. If tutoring were contributing only to productive human capital, it would not likely raise 
scores on an aptitude test, at least during those typical short courses offered by tutoring firms.                  
Although it is analytically difficult to distinguish between the signaling and productive human  
capital stories, signaling incentives are likely to explain some tutoring in societies like Korea and Japan 
that make especially heavy use of tutoring (Rogers, 1996; Chae et al., 2004; and Lee, 2007). 31 But 
three points should be kept in mind. First, a (partial) signaling story changes the situation depicted in 
Figure 1 to a degree, but does not qualitatively change the conclusions. A signaling equilibrium 
steepens the slope of the private-tutoring supply curve, by reducing the effective units of education 
(human capital) received, but the outcome does not change fundamentally. Second, societies 
Korea that apparently make greater use of signaling are among the highest performers on 
internationally normed and well-designed student assessments such as PISA and TIMSS, sugge
like 
sting 
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signaling value.  Finally, the appropriate response in the signaling case is probably not to discourag
tutoring—as through the ban that Korea imposed in 1980—but to address the problem at its source. 
For example, the government could revise university admissions policies so that they place less 
reliance on a single examination that makes for a tempti
e 
ng ability signal.   
7.  Policy Implications  
The analysis in this paper has provided evidence that, both in theory and in practice, under certain 
caveats discussed in Section 5, tutoring can play a positive role in raising education outcomes as a 
complement to the formal school systems. Our earlier discussions also suggest that in the absence of 
corruption, private tutoring increases the welfare of households and society overall. However, private 
tutoring may place poorer households at some disadvantage compared to richer households, 
particularly when corruption distorts the tutoring market; corruption also reduces the efficiency of the 
tutoring equilibrium. Thus while the discussion above holds rich policy implication for private 
tutoring for both developed and developing countries along several dimensions, this final section 
explores what these findings imply for education policy in developing countries, with a focus on the 
control of corruption.  
7.1.  Government policy and the control of corruption:  A taxonomy 
Before turning to policy recommendations, it is useful to consider what policies toward private 
tutoring have been implemented by governments in the past. Bray (2003) categorizes governments 
into four types, depending on their stance and action toward private tutoring: banning (type I), 
ignoring (type II), recognizing and regulating (type IIII), or actively encouraging (type IV). Table 4 is 
constructed mainly from Bray (2003, 2006) and Silova and Bray (2006b), with examples of the 
countries and territories falling into these categories, as well as several typical measures implemented 
by these countries on private tutoring. It should be noted that type III governments differ in the 
degree to which they react to private tutoring, in that not all the measures listed are implemented by 
each country. Nevertheless, the listed measures provide a good overview of how governments have 
reacted to private tutoring. 
The studies by Bray and Silova offer helpful further detail on these different groups of 
governments.  First, they note that the type I governments all failed in their attempts to ban private 
tutoring, for different reasons. Bans in Cambodia and Myanmar have failed because those countries’ 
institutions are too weak to implement the policy, while in Mauritius and Korea, the bans faced too 
much opposition from vested interests. The latter two countries responded by subsequently lifting the 
ban and regulating private tutoring instead. 
  20Type II governments, on the other hand, ignore private tutoring. Like type I, type II governments 
can also roughly be divided into two groups, based on their reasons for ignoring private tutoring.  The 
first group (Nigeria, Sri Lanka) is characterized by weaker institutions and little capacity to monitor 
private tutoring.  The second group of countries (Canada, the United Kingdom) has stronger 
institutions and adequate capacity for monitor private tutoring, but does not choose to regulate the 
sector, either because they consider it to have small and insignificant effects or because they prefer to 
leave it to market forces.  
Compared to type II governments, type III governments take a more active role in controlling 
private tutoring (Hong Kong, Mauritius, Vietnam). These governments recognize the importance of 
private tutoring and attempt to control it in various ways, both direct and indirect:  prohibiting private 
tutoring in early grades; forbidding teachers from tutoring their own students; stipulating fees, class 
sizes, or syllabi for private tutoring classes; and reducing disparities in schools.  
Type IV governments take the opposite stance from type I governments, in that they actively 
encourage private tutoring (Singapore, South Africa, Zanzibar). These governments believe that 
private tutoring contributes to human capital development and that private tutoring lessons are an 
effective means of tailoring education to the needs of students. These governments’ policies thus 
range from offering general encouragement to providing subsidies for private tutoring, training 
courses for tutors and tax incentives.  
While the list of countries needs to be expanded to allow generalization, Bray (2003, 2006) and 
Silova and Bray (2006b)’s observations provide a useful background for policy makers to formulate 
ideas. Given our earlier discussion about the distortions of equity and efficiency of forced private 
tutoring due to corruption, it may be useful to add another dimension to the above observations, 
which is a government’s control of corruption. For each country and territory, Table 4 therefore lists 
in parentheses one measure of the control of corruption: Kaufmann et al.’s (2007) percentile rankings 
of countries and territories on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher percentile rankings representing 
better control of corruption.32 
According to this measure, the first group in type I governments appears to have low control of 
corruption, while the second group has high control of corruption. (However, it should be 
remembered that both these two groups were not successful with their bans on private tutoring). 
Similarly, for type II governments, the first group has only low to moderate control over corruption, 
while the second group has high control of corruption. Type III governments range from low to high 
control of corruption, while type IV governments range from moderate to high control of corruption. 
These associations between type and governance quality will be useful in gauging the feasibility of 
different policies. 
  217.2.  A (tentative) agenda for policy toward private tutoring   
Based on these results and the casual (but intuitive) observations about the association between 
corruption and government policies above, some tentative policy recommendations can be proposed. 
First, since private tutoring is a widespread and growing phenomenon, we believe that it is time that 
governments devote more attention to this issue. The benign-neglect policy of type II governments in 
Table 4 runs the risk of letting tutoring-related corruption go unchecked, in the case of the countries 
with low control-of-corruption scores. Even the other countries in this group may be missing 
opportunities to use tutoring as an instrument of education policy, as a flexible sector that can help 
address imbalances between supply and demand for education. Government actions can range from 
monitoring (e.g., collecting data on private tutoring attendance, private tutoring businesses) to taking 
steps to ensure that private tutoring can operate free of corruption and unnecessary barriers to 
competition.   
Similarly, more research needs to be done on private tutoring. We still do not have much 
empirical evidence on the macro-level determinants of private tutoring. In particular, more cross-
country data needs to be collected to allow researchers to tease out the impacts of government 
policies and interventions (e.g. educational subsidies, public expenditure on education, high-stakes 
testing system) on creating the demand for private tutoring. On a micro level, more research should 
be done on the household decision to send children to school (e.g. household choice of private 
education versus public education versus public education with private tutoring; household choice 
between investing in the quantity and the “quality” of children), as well as the short-term and long-
term impacts of private tutoring on students’ well-being (e.g. student satisfaction levels, health status, 
labor-market outcomes). 
Second, while it may be welfare-enhancing to ban private tutoring when all tutoring is provided 
by corrupt teachers, as in the analysis above, a total ban is very difficult to implement in practice. The 
experience we have from type I governments in Table 4 shows that this approach has not been 
effective.33 Thus, it is perhaps better that resources be focused on monitoring and regulating—rather 
than eradicating—private tutoring. Regulatory approaches can focus on reducing opportunities for 
corruption by prohibiting public-school teachers from tutoring their own students.  
Third, the private-tutoring markets in countries (territories) with low corruption are likely to be 
more competitive.  In such circumstances, our analysis suggests that private tutoring is likely to be 
welfare-enhancing. Governments may even want to encourage the growth of the private tutoring 
industry, as Singapore, South Africa, and Zanzibar (Tanzania) have done, for example by training 
tutors. In such cases, policymakers should monitor the development of the industry and should 
address concerns about it using the appropriate instruments—which, as suggested earlier, may mean 
going to the root of the problem rather than holding the private tutoring sector responsible.  Most 
  22notably, in cases where tutoring appears to replicate social and geographical inequalities, government 
action will be most effective if it targets the source of the underlying inequalities. Ways to do this 
could include equalizing public-school finance across rich and poor districts. 
Finally, governments may want to explore directly financing tutoring programs as a flexible means 
of educating disadvantaged children.  While more evidence is needed on this point, the findings on 
targeted government- and NGO-financed tutoring programs suggest that this can be an effective 
means of improving educational outcomes for those children.  Such programs, assuming they are well 
designed and implemented, have the added benefit of avoiding any equity-efficiency tradeoffs:  by 
increasing the productivity of disadvantaged children, they clearly promote equity goals as well.
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School Disaffection, 2(1): 15-20.    Table 1: The scale of private tutoring in selected countries 
Country  Year  Level/Grade/ Age  Percent of students 
tutored 
Comment Sources 
Secondary school  57%   
Azerbaijan 2004 
University 92%  These first-year university students received private 








Cambodia 1997-1998  Primary  school  31% 
The proportion of students taking private tutoring was 




1999  Students age 13 
and 16 
The proportion of 
students age 13 and age 
16 taking private 
tutoring respectively 
ranges from 5% to 17% 
and 8% to 20% across 
districts 
  CME 
(2000) 
Canada 
1997  School age children  N/A 
Over the past 30 years, the number of formal tutoring 















  29 
Greece 2000  University 
80% attended group 
(cram) preparatory 
schools, 50% received 
individual private 
tutoring and 33% 








Hong Kong  1996-1998  Secondary school 
35% of Secondary 1-3 
students; 47% of 
Secondary  4-5 
students; 70% of 









tutoring in mathematics 
and 41% in science 
This study uses data from the 1995 International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)  
NCES 
(1996) 
Kenya 2000  Grade  6  88% 
- 58% of the students attending private tutoring paid 
for it. The proportion of pupils who received private 
tutoring had gone up from 69% in 1998 to 88% in 
2000. 
- This study uses data from the Southern and Eastern 
Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality 




  30 
Primary school  83% 
Middle school  75%  Republic of 
Korea  2003 
High school  56% 
In aggregate, 73% of all Korean students had private 
tutoring. This study cites estimates from the Korean 
Educational Development Institute 
Kwak (2004) 




Mauritius 2001  Grade  6  87% 
- 91% of these students paid for private tutoring. The 
proportion of pupils who received private tutoring 
had gone up from 78% in 1995 to 87% in 2001. 
- This study uses data from the Southern and Eastern 
Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality 




Romania 1994  Grade  12 
32% in rural areas and 
58% in urban areas 
received private 
supplementary tutoring 
This study cites estimates from a study undertaken by 
the Romanian Institute for Sciences of Education, in 




Primary school  49%  Singapore 1992 
Secondary school  30% 
 George  (1992) 




  31  32
 
Turkey 2001  High  school  35% 
The number of private tutoring centers in 2002 was 
2,100 (up from only 174 in 1984), which is close to 
the number of 2,500 high schools in the whole 
country in the same year.  
This study uses estimates from the Private Tutoring 
Centers Association in Turkey in 2003.  
Tansel & 
Bircan (2006) 
Ukraine 2004  University  68%  These students received private tutoring in their last 
year in secondary school. 
Hrynevych et 
al (2006) 
Years 6 & 11  26%  United 
Kingdom  2003 
Year 13  30% 




1990-1992  High-school 
students   
To prepare for the SAT or ACT, 14%-21% take 
special courses at high school,  8%-14% take group 
private tutoring (commercial coaching classes), and 




2000    
It is estimated that almost 7 million elementary 
school students are likely to take tutoring, and that 
tutoring has grown to be a professional-service 




Primary students  31% 
Lower secondary 
students  56%  Vietnam 1997-1998 
Upper secondary 
students  77% 
Around 34% of the households with children in 
school send their children to private lessons and the 
majority of them (90%) allocate between 1% and 5% 
of the total household expenditure on private tutoring 
Dang (2007b) 
Zanzibar 2000  Grade  6  56% 
- 38% of these students paid for private tutoring. The 
proportion of pupils who received private tutoring 
had gone up from 46% in 1995 to 56% in 2000. 
- This study uses data from the Southern and Eastern 
Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality 
(SACMEQ) II.  
Nassor et al. 
(2005) 





   Sources: This Table is largely based on Table II.1 in Dang (2007a). 
 Table 2: Most common factors that determine private tutoring  
 
   Egypt  Japan  Republic 
of Korea   Turkey      Vietnam    





students   
Dependent variables 






















Log of per 




                 
Independent variables              
Individual & household characteristics              
Household income  N.S./  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++   
Father's years of schooling  ++  +++  +++  ++  N.S.  +   
Mother's years of schooling N.S.  +++  +++  +++  +  N.S.   
                 
Community characteristics                
Urban   +++  +++  +++  +++  +  N.S.   
                 
Number of observations  6114  3053  6576  3898  2347  1179   
Econometric model  Tobit  Logit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit   
Note: 1. + significant at 10%; ++ significant at 5%; +++ significant at 1%.  N.S. stands for not significant.   
2. For Egypt, the significance level of household income is inferred from the significance levels for dummy variables    
indicating households in different wealth quintiles, which ranges from insignificant to highly significant.     
3. For Republic of Korea, the significance level on the urban variable is inferred from the strong significance levels for the dummy 
variables  
indicating living in high density residential areas, living in Seoul, living in metropolitan city or a small and medium-sized 
city.   
4. For Turkey, household income is log of total household expenditure. Father's years of schooling are for household heads.   
5. For Vietnam, household income is log of household expenditure per capita.       
Sources: Estimates are from Assaad and El-Badawy (2004) for Egypt (Table 4), Stevenson and Baker (1992) for Japan,    
Kim and Lee (2004) for Republic of Korea (Table 4), Tansel and Bircan (2006) for Turkey, and Dang (2007b) for Vietnam.   
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Table 3: The impacts of private tutoring in selected recent studies 
 
a.  Studies that do not control for the endogeneity of private tutoring  
Country  Year  Level/Grade/ Age  Summary of Main Impacts  Comments   Sources 
Japan  1980-1982  High-school seniors  - For students in the first year out of 
high school, among forms of private 
tutoring, practice examination and 
correspondence course improve the 
probability of entering college by 16% 
and 25%. 
- For students in the second year out of 
high school, attending special tutoring 
school increases the probability of 
entering college by 80%. Having a 
private tutor significantly reduces this 
probability, but this most likely reflects 
the remedial character of this form of 
private tutoring in Japan.  
One variable 






is likely to be 
endogenous 










Kenya  1995  Youth ages 13-18  Private tutoring reduces the chance of 
repeating grades and increases student 
academic performance 
This study does 







2000-2001  Middle and high-
school students 
Pre-class tutoring (private tutoring that 
teaches a school’s curriculum at least one 
month ahead of its schedule) has no 
short-term or long-term effects on 












tutoring or not. 




Eighth-grade students  Time spent with a private tutor has a 
negative impact on student academic 
performance 
 Cheo  & 
Quah 
(2005) 
Vietnam 2002  8-year-old  children  Although private tutoring does not 
significantly increase the children’s 
writing and multiplication test scores, it 
does double these children’s reading test 
scores 
This study does 
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b.  Studies that control for the endogeneity of private tutoring  
Country Year Level/Grade/ 
Age 
Summary of Main Impacts  Comments/ Instruments for 
private tutoring  
Sources 
Germany 1998-1999  Students  in 
grades five to 
eleven 
Receiving private tutoring causes a 
larger improvement in academic 
performance and motivational 
variables.  
This study uses a form of 
matching, in which students in 
tutoring identify a match, in an 
attempt to account for 
unobserved differences between 





India 2001-2004  Third-  and 
fourth-grade 
students 
- A remedial education program 
increases average test scores for all 
children in treated schools by 0.28 
standard deviations. A computer-
assisted learning program increases 
math scores by 0.47 standard 
deviations.  
- One year after the program, the 
initial gains reduced to 0.1 standard 
deviations. 
This study uses a randomized 
experiment method.  
Banerjee et 
al. (2007) 
Indonesia 2002-2003  Fourth  grade 
students 
Private tutoring has no impacts on 
mathematics or dictation scores 
A variable indicating school 
clustering in terms of private 
tutoring is used as the 
instrument for private tutoring  
Suryadarma 
et al. (2006) 
Israel 1999-2001  Underperformi
ng high-school 
students 
- A remedial education program 
increases the mean matriculation rate 
for schools and participating students 
by 3-4% and 11-12% respectively.  
- The program expenditure per 
participant is about 40% of the annual 
expenditure per high-school student in 
Israel. 
This study uses both difference-
in-difference and IV methods. 
Instrumental variables for the 
proportion of students 
participating in the program 
include the interaction terms of 
school size, year dummy variable 








Years spent after high-school 
graduation cramming in private 
tutoring centers (ronin) improve the 
quality of the college students go to, 
thus raising earning indirectly (through 
this improvement in college quality).  
This study uses an IV method. 
However, the study does not 
control for other household or 
school or community 
characteristics (such parental 





Coaching (commercial private tutoring 
courses) increases SAT math scores by 
14-15 points, SAT verbal scores by 6-8 
points, ACT math and English scores 
by 0-0.6 points, but decrease ACT 
reading scores by 0.6-0.7 points.   
- This study does not report the 
variables used as instruments for 
private tutoring.  






1997-1999 Third-  and 
sixth-grade 
students 
Summer remedial programs increase 
math and reading achievement for 
third-graders by about 12% of the 
average annual learning gains. The 
corresponding figures are around 6% 
for sixth-graders.  
This study uses a regression 








Private tutoring has positive effects on 
student academic performance.  
This study uses the private 
tutoring fees charged by schools 
as instruments for students 
taking private tutoring. 
Dang 
(2007b) 
  35Table 4: Government Policies Toward Private Tutoring In Selected Countries/ Territories 
Type  General Policy  Typical Measures  Country  Notes 
Cambodia (7), 
Myanmar (1) 
  1  Prohibit private 
tutoring  Total ban on private tutoring 
Mauritius (67), 
Republic of Korea (65) 
The bans were implemented at 
various times in these countries, 
but they were ineffective because 






Sri Lanka (49)  
Most of these countries have weak 
institutions and do not have the 
capacity to regulate private 
tutoring 
2 Ignore   
Canada (94), 
United Kingdom (94) 
These countries have strong 
institutions and have the capacity 
to regulate private tutoring. 
However, they consider the private 
tutoring market outside of their 
sphere of responsibility. 
3  Recognize and 
regulate 
- Generally prohibit private 
tutoring in early grades; prohibit 
teachers from tutoring their own 
students. 
- Regulations accompanied by 
inspections and sanctions on 
private tutoring fees, class sizes, 
syllabi. 
-  Regulations on infrastructure of 
private tutoring centers. 
- Reduce stratification in the 
education system, reduce 
disparities in schools, raise public 
awareness about negative effects of 
private tutoring. 
 
Hong Kong (93), 
Lithuania (60), 
 Mauritius (67),  




4  Actively 
encourage 
- Encouragement policies toward 
private tutoring. 
- Subsidies for private tutoring, 
dissemination of information to 
link potential tutors and clients, 
training courses for tutors, taxation 
incentives. 
Singapore (98), 
 South Africa (71),  
Zanzibar (Tanzania) 
(43) 
These countries believe that 
private tutoring contributes to 
human capital development and 
caters to the needs of students. 
Note: The typical measures are given for illustration purposes, and the countries listed in each category may not 
implement all these measures. The number in parentheses after each country is its percentile ranking in control of 
corruption, with higher rankings representing higher control of corruption. This Table is constructed mainly from Bray 
(2003, 2006), Silova and Bray (2006b). The cases for Croatia are added from Dedic et al. (2006), Georgia from Matiashvili 
and Kutateladze (2006), Mongolia from Dong et al. (2006), Lithuania from Budiene and Zabulionis (2006),  Ukraine from 
Hrynevych et al. (2006), and Vietnam from Dang (2007a) respectively. The corruption rankings are taken from 
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1 Both authors are with the Development Research Group, World Bank; email: hdang@worldbank.org (Hai-Anh Dang) 
and hrogers@worldbank.org (Halsey Rogers). The authors are grateful to Emmanuel Jimenez, Mark Bray, and three 
anonymous referees for their constructive comments, and to the Hewlett Foundation for its partial support of this 
research. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do 
not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its 
affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. 
2 Our focus is on private tutoring for academic subjects; Lipscomb (2007) and Barron et al. (2000), among others, 
examine how non-academic extracurricular involvement affects academic achievement.  
3 Strictly speaking, while it may not be correct for these public-financed tutoring programs to fit under the denomination 
“private tutoring”, results from these studies are highly relevant to the discussion about equity and efficiency with private 
tutoring. Furthermore, these tutoring programs have clear policy implications, since they represent what tutoring may 
look like if it is to be used on a large scale by the government. 
4 A similar and extreme case happens in Taiwan, where private tutoring is also popular. One Taiwanese student was even 
recorded as saying “The very start of my day is at the end of school when I go to the crammer [sic]school; the 
mainstream school where I spend most of my day is merely my leisure time” (Wu, 2004). 
5 It is also reported that the number of private tutoring colleges listed in the Telephone Book’s Yellow Pages in Sydney—
the largest city in Australia—increased from 60 in 1989 to 222 in 2002 (Kenny and Faunce, 2004). More evidence on the   38
                                                                                                                                                                
growth of private tutoring for several countries in Southern and Eastern Africa can be found in Paviot, Heinsohn and 
Korkman (2008). 
6 Particularly in developing countries, the public education system is well-known for its rigidity, lack of teacher incentives 
and accountability, and inadequate infrastructure (see Glewwe and Kremer (2006) for a recent review). Even worse, 
teacher absenteeism is rather common in a number of countries (Chaudhury et al., 2006).  Note that the supply curve 
need not turn completely inelastic at the upper end.  We show this extreme case for ease of exposition, but all that is 
necessary is that at the margin, the public system be less able or willing to provide additional lessons (that is, have more 
inelastic supply) than the private tutoring sector is.     
7 Note that this is the public-education supply curve with subsidy – i.e., as viewed by the households – rather than the 
underlying marginal costs of supplying a public education. We assume that this cost of public schooling to the households 
is less than the cost of private schools, even though the underlying cost for the private school to produce education may 
be lower. We make no assumptions about the unit cost of private tutoring relative to the unit cost of private schools; the 
advantage of private tutors is instead in their flexibility and ability to supplement the public system, by providing as many 
additional hours (lessons) as the household demands.    
8 Other factors that shift the demand curve include the price of substitute goods or the number of buyers on the market. 
For our purpose, we focus on the above-mentioned factors only.  
9 Other papers that investigate the determinants of private tutoring using smaller survey data include Buchmann (2002), 
Davies (2004), and Psacharopoulous and Papakonstantinou (2005).  
10 The dependent variables and the other control variables generally differ across the models used in the cited studies for 
each country. For example, while the paper on Japan looks at the probability that students participate in after-school 
private tutoring classes, the remaining studies consider the determinants of expenditure on private tutoring either at the 
household level or child level. And while only the Egypt paper control for parental presence in the household, among 
other things, only the Turkey paper control for whether the mother is single. 
11 See Becker and Lewis (1973) or Blake (1989) for more details on this issue.  
12 See Rogers (1996) for a model of this effect, based on the experiences of Korea and Japan. 
13 It is reported that one rebel group in the northeastern state of Manipur in India has forbidden all teachers and 
professors from providing private tutoring classes, in an attempt to stop the rampant situation that teachers do not come 
to class because they are too busy tutoring to supplement their low salaries. Not surprisingly, even the Indian 
government-appointed official in charge of higher education in Manipur sympathizes with the rebels’ efforts (Chronicle 
of Higher Education, 2003). 
14 The direction of bias depends on the correlation between income levels and the private tutoring variables. If this 
correlation is positive, the coefficients on the share of public expenditure in GNP and gross enrolment rates would be 
biased upward; if negative, the reverse would be true.  
15 Generally, variables are considered to be endogenous if they correlate with unobserved characteristics which determine 
the outcome. See, for example, Gujarati (2003, p. 701) or Greene (2007, p. 357) for an introduction.  
16 See, for example, Bedi and Garg (2000) and Newhouse and Beegle (2005) for public-private comparisons in the case of 
Indonesia. 
17 Another variant of the randomized-experiment method is regression discontinuity design, which takes advantage of 
what are in effect natural experiments in the region around a discrete (and exogenous) jump in the variable of interest. 
For a detailed and rigorous treatment of these econometric methods, see Wooldridge (2002).  
18 Providing the tutoring free seems likely to reduce its effectiveness in promoting learning, so if anything, this should bias 
downward the estimates of the returns to tutoring. 
19 In the case of the US, there is overwhelming evidence that private tutoring raises achievement. Other studies that find 
private tutoring has positive effects on the SAT include Becker (1990) and Powers and Rock (1999). A recent meta-
analysis study of the effects of one-to-one tutoring programs in reading for elementary students with learning difficulties 
shows that these programs improve student reading skills (Elbaum et al., 2000). 
20 It is worth noting, however, that certain features of this Indonesian experience (in which one of us participated) may 
restrict its general applicability.  First, the test administered to the students was quite simple, with the math test consisting 
of only twelve questions and the dictation test only one short passage.  Second, limited data on student attributes and 
investments was available, so the tutoring variable used was a crude one – whether or not the student was currently taking 
tutoring.     39
                                                                                                                                                                
21 A second program studied by Banerjee et al. (2007) used computers, rather than human tutors, to deliver the tutorials. 
This program raises math scores for children under the program by 0.36 standard deviations in the first year and 0.54 
standard deviations in the second year. However, it is much more expensive than the first program, at $15.18 per student 
per year  
22 These assumptions assume a constant lifetime increment in earnings due to the program of $127.5 per year, the 
positive payoffs begin 4 years after the costs are incurred and remain in effect for 43 years until the tutored students reach 
age 65, and the program affects only the tutored students’ wages and there are no general equilibrium effects. See Lavy 
and Schlosser (2005) for more details.    
23 20,000 VND is also equivalent to around 2% of the household spending on education by an average Vietnamese 
household with children in school (Dang, 2007). 
24 This calculation revises and updates those in Dang (2007) and is available upon request. Similar calculations for primary 
students also show that the gains from 20,000 VND worth of private tutoring reduce the expected cost of repeating a 
grade by around 25,000 VND.  
25 See Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) or Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) for discussion of the heterogeneity in 
returns to education in instrumental variables models.  
26 Note that if the household’s demand for education is on the D1 (low demand for education) curve, the household 
would consume no private tutoring at the given supply curve.  
27 From the perspective of the school system as a whole, private schools may be viewed as a useful complement to the 
work of government schools.   
28 Alternatively, the teacher could give preferential treatment to particular children in return for a fee. On one hand, this 
may reduce teacher time and energy in the mainstream classes, but on the other hand this may encourage teachers to 
work additional hours.  In this case, the problem of assessing the efficiency of allowing tutoring (assuming for a moment 
that policymakers have a choice) seems analogous to a problem from health economics that Cutler (2002) discusses.  
29 Mingat and Tan (2003) show that teacher salaries generally exceed, and are often several multiples of, income per capita 
in developing countries. Teachers tend to be paid a standardized salary wherever they are posted, or even receive a bonus 
for serving in rural areas; as a result, their income advantage over poorer rural residents will be even greater. 
30 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this example. 
31 The analytical difficulty is to distinguish between tutoring to acquire a signal and tutoring to acquire human capital 
when tutoring leads to higher test scores (and perhaps even school grades, if the school’s curriculum is aligned to 
entrance exams), and test scores have no or little productive values. Even if we have long-term longitudinal data on 
students that includes their labor market experience, higher test scores are likely to raise wages in either case, as long as 
the exam signal is used by employers. 
32 While the timing of this corruption measure does not always coincide exactly with the timing of the government 
actions described in Table 4, there has been little change over time in the corruption index for these countries, except for 
Tanzania (Kaufmann et al, 2007b).    
33 Furthermore, it is likely to have the unintended effect of preventing other, more beneficial private tutoring, because in 
reality corrupt teachers will not be the only tutors available. 